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Abstract 
What do people value about a creation: the idea behind it, or the labor needed for its 
implementation? Recent developmental research suggests that children by the age of 6 begin 
to value ideas over labor. Yet, much less is known about whether adults similarly attribute a 
higher value to ideas and idea givers than to labor and idea executors. In seven studies (N = 
1,463), we explored the relative valuation of ideas versus labor in adults, its mechanisms and 
boundary conditions. Participants learned about an idea giver and a laborer who collaborated 
to create a product and indicated who deserves ownership and monetary compensation for the 
product. Contrary to what has been reported for children, Studies 1a-1c found that participants 
valued the contribution of the laborer more than the contribution of the idea giver. This labor-
valuation effect emerged even when participants themselves were idea givers (Study 1b), and 
it was replicated across different populations (including legal professionals, Study 1c) and 
contexts (e.g., art works and businesses, Study 2). Studies 3a and 3b established perceived 
effort as a central psychological process behind the labor-valuation effect. Finally, Study 4 
extended the effect to the realm of praise and blame judgments, showing that laborers receive 
more praise for positive outcomes, but less blame for negative outcomes, relative to idea 
givers. The current findings may provide a useful framework for understanding the role of 
effort in lay peopleÕs valuation of ideas and labor, thereby bridging research on creativity, 
effort, and valuation judgments. 
 
Keywords: Idea Valuation; Labor Valuation; Creativity; Perceived Effort; Praise and Blame 
Judgments 
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ÒWhat one does is what counts and not what one had the intention of doing.Ó 
ÑPablo Picasso (1881-1973) 
 
Introduction 
 Imagine spending a rainy Saturday afternoon at the museum. Although you are not an 
expert, you generally enjoy art and today you particularly appreciate some of the pieces in the 
new exhibition. But then you stumble across this: Yves Klein, oil on canvas, displaying a 
simple blue square. Nothing else, no title, just blue. As many other people might be inclined 
to, you begin to ask yourself why this should be considered ÒartÓ or, for that matter, why this 
should be of any value and be displayed in a respectable museum. The domain of art offers a 
particularly striking example for the dissociation between observable laborÐÐas manifested in 
the art pieceÐÐand unobservable ideas and concepts behind the work. However, neither labor 
(ÒdoingÓ), nor ideas (ÒintentionsÓ) alone seem sufficient for such creations. Typically, both 
are necessary contributions and should thus be valued by people to some degree. This raises 
an interesting question that includes but is not limited to the domain of art: do people 
generally think that ideas are cheap, and that it is the labor needed for their execution that 
really matters, or do they value ideas in their own right, for example, when legally protecting 
them as in the case of Yves Klein and his color ÒblueÓ?  
 The goal of the present research was to explore lay peopleÕs relative valuations of 
ideas and idea givers in comparison to laborers and idea executors. We do not know yet 
whether and how adults might value one over the other. Because creations frequently involve 
both idea givers and laborers, comparing how their relative contributions are valued may shed 
light on lay peopleÕs conceptualization of creativity and its relation to psychological processes 
such as perceived effort. In addition to adultsÕ take on the idea-versus-labor issue, we thus 
examine how perceptions of effort and outcome valence might contribute to it. As we focus 
on collaborative creations involving the execution of a creative idea, the prototypical scenario 
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is situated in a more or less creative context. However, we explore a wider range of scenarios, 
some of which are highly prototypical for the creative context (e.g., art), and some of which 
might be considered less prototypical (e.g., businesses).   
 
Unobservable Minds and Valuation of Ideas 
 People frequently refer to minds and mental states in order to explain behavior that 
they observeÐÐfor example, when considering an actorÕs intention before judging his or her 
behavior (Cushman, 2008). Minds are so important to us that we also perceive them in non-
human or non-living entities (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007). People even impose complex 
mental narratives on simple geometrical figures such as circles and squares when they are 
showing systematic movement (Heider & Simmel, 1944). Our cognitive architecture seems to 
be designed in such a way that it differentiates minds from the physical world containing and 
surrounding them (Bloom, 2004; Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015, 2017; Hood, Gjersoe, & 
Bloom, 2012). Humans begin to utilize their mind-reading abilities at a very early age (Frith 
& Frith, 2003), and routinely refer to mental states to explain much of the complex social 
behavior they observe or are part of (Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). In other words, 
humans rely on mental states as an important source of information to make sense of the 
world. 
 One of the mental capacities that people seem to value in particular is our ability to 
come up with ideas that are both novel and useful (Amabile, 1983). Such creativity of the 
mind is strongly desired by most people, and has been associated with a host of desirable 
states such as personal well-being (Hirt, Devers, & McCrea, 2008) or interpersonal 
attractiveness (Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006). In fact, creative ideas are not just 
valued by lay people or studied by scholars, but they become increasingly important in 
todayÕs economyÐÐconsequently referred to as the Òcreative economyÓ (Howkins, 2002).  
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 Research documenting the valuation of originals over duplicates is particularly suited 
to illustrate adultsÕ and childrenÕs idea-valuation tendencies. This valuation of originals is 
evident already in children (Hood & Bloom, 2008), and it has been observed across various 
domains such as art (Newman & Bloom, 2012) and consumer behavior (van Horen & Pieters, 
2012; 2013). For example, consumers show a strong preference for original brands over 
copycat brands (van Horen & Pieters, 2012; 2013). Similarly, in the domain of art, lay people 
and experts alike are willing to pay substantially more money for an original art piece than for 
a duplicateÐÐeven when they cannot tell the difference between the two. In fact, our legal 
system protects the certificate of authenticity attached to an original art piece and punishes 
those who try to sell forgeries.  
 Finally, developmental findings help to shed some light on the relative valuation of 
both ideas and labor. These findings suggest that by the age of five, children understand that 
other people have ideas and dislike the copying of these ideas (Olson & Shaw, 2011). 
Moreover, childrenÕs aversion to plagiarism emerges across different cultures that vary with 
regard to how much value they place on the protection of ideasÐÐsuch as the United States, 
Mexico, and China (Yang, Shaw, Garduno, & Olson, 2014). More specifically, children 
dislike plagiarism because it negatively affects a creatorÕs reputation by taking credit away 
from him or her (Shaw & Olson, 2015). Young children show an appreciation of creative 
ideas, and they acknowledge the superiority of original ideas over mere copies. These 
developmental findings hence mirror what previous research with adult samples has revealed: 
people appreciate original ideas and dislike duplicates and copycats.  
The most straightforward comparison of idea valuation as opposed to labor valuation, 
however, has been conducted with 4-6 year-old children in a study by Li, Shaw, and Olson 
(2013). These authors found that 6-year-old children (but not 4-year-old children) evinced a 
robust preference for ideas over labor. Specifically, in a set of three studies, 6-year-olds 
preferred a picture that was based on their idea to a picture that was based on their labor. This 
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relative valuation of ideas over labor also emerged from a third-person perspective, that is, 
when children were asked to assign ownership of a creation to an idea giver or a laborer who 
were in disagreement about who owns the creation. Whereas previous research has suggested 
that adults generally value ideasÐÐmuch as children do (Li et al., 2013)ÐÐ, we do not know 
yet how they value ideas in direct comparison to their execution, that is, the labor needed to 
implement them. 
 
Observable Effort and Valuation of Labor 
 Regardless of how much people value ideas, ideas usually need to be executed and 
implemented to have impact and bring about change. Consequently, it should come as no 
surprise that modern societies greatly value effort and are even described as Òworking 
societiesÓ that glorify labor (Arendt,1960). The Japanese society took this to the extreme and 
has since the 1970Õs been coping with Òkarōshi,Ó that is, Òoverwork deathÓ (Nishiyama & 
Johnson, 1997)ÐÐpeople have literally worked themselves to death. Such an existential 
meaning of labor is corroborated by meta-analytic findings attesting to unemploymentÕs 
detrimental effect on mental health (Paul & Moser, 2009). 
Numerous accounts attest to the important function of labor and effort, both in 
intrapersonal and interpersonal signaling of value (see Inzlicht, Shenhav, & Olivola, 2018, for 
a recent overview). Not just humans (Lewis, 1965), but also considerably less complex 
animals such as rats (Lydall, Gilmour, & Dwyer, 2010) have been found to place more value 
on rewards following increased levels of effort. The association between perceived effort and 
valuation becomes evident in many domains spanning from dissonance reduction via effort 
justification (e.g., increased liking of a group after having invested great effort to become a 
member; Aronson & Mills, 1959) to the IKEA effect (valuation of mundane objects such as 
standardized IKEA boxes upon having folded them oneself as opposed to evaluating pre-
assembled ones; Norton, Mochon, & Ariely, 2012). In addition to increasing the perceived 
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value of objects and goals, effort can itself be rewarding, for example, when exerting effort 
during challenging tasks and experiencing flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). More broadly, 
valuation of labor is also a pillar of one of the world religions, more specifically, of a 
protestant work ethic; Furnham, 1990), endorsed by millions of individuals. 
 Corroborating the view of effort as an important cue that signals value, research has 
shown that people consider an object of art to be more valuable if its creator has invested 
more (vs. less) effort into making itÐÐa phenomenon labelled Òeffort heuristicÓ (Kruger, Van 
Boven, & Altermatt, 2004). These considerations extend to the domain of ownership 
ascriptions. Specifically, previous research indicates that people tend to determine ownership 
according to the Òlabor ruleÓ: whoever invested labor into creating something, should become 
the owner (Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014). Such a Òlabor ruleÓ has been established across 
different cultures (Kanngiesser, Itakura, & Hood, 2014) and is considered especially 
important if the invested effort increases the objective value of the creation.  
Finally, development studies suggest that, under certain circumstances, children do not 
only value ideas but also effort. For instance, children as young as three years (but also adults) 
transfer the ownership of one personÕs property to another person following the second 
personÕs investment of Òcreative laborÓ into that propertyÐÐfor example, when crafting 
something new from modeling clay owned by someone else (Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 
2010). In addition, and similar to adults, children also prefer objects that they themselves 
created over identical objects created by others. They thus display a similar tendency to value 
their own labor, but they may do so for different reasons than adults (Marsh, Kanngiesser, & 
Hood, 2018).  
Taken together, people seem to generally value ideas, as much as they seem to 
generally value effort and labor. However, none of the previous studies directly pitted the 
contribution of an idea giver against the contribution of a laborer to assess whether and under 
which conditions adults may value one over the other. Insofar as effort is primarily associated 
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with visible labor, people might neglect its role in the less accessible idea-generation process, 
hence underappreciating ideas and idea givers. 
 
Present Research 
 In order to investigate these propositions, the basic experimental set-up in our research 
introduced two target persons who collaborated to create a product (e.g., a picture, a start-up 
business, or a meal). One target was presented as the idea giver, whereas the other target was 
presented as the laborer, executing the idea. Then participants were asked how much they 
valued the idea giverÕs and the laborerÕs contributions to the mutual creation, thereby 
assessing participantsÕ relative preferences for one over the other.   
 First, we ran an exploratory study, adapting previously used materials and procedures 
for adult samples (Study 1a). Contrary to 6-year-old children (Li et al., 2013), adult 
participants in that study displayed a clear labor-valuation effect. We conceptually replicated 
this finding in two follow-up studies that additionally tested potential boundary conditions 
such as adopting a perspective that should facilitate egocentrically-motivated valuation of 
ideas (Study 1b) or legal expertise that should make participants particularly sensitive to the 
protection of ideas (Study 1c). We then ran another replication study in yet another 
population, to establish generalizability of the labor-valuation effect across various domains, 
including art, cooking and business (Study 2). An additional set of studies tested the process 
hypothesis that perceived effort underlies the relative appreciation of labor over ideas, using 
both a statistical approach to mediation (Study 3a) and an experimental approach (Study 3b). 
Lastly, we extend the labor-valuation effect to another judgment domain, that is, attributions 
of responsibility for product success versus failure. Drawing from previous research on 
asymmetries of blame and praise judgments (e.g., Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003), we 
tested a potential asymmetry between idea giver and laborer when assigning praise for 
positive outcomes as opposed to blame for negative outcomes (Study 4).  
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 For all studies, we report all measures, conditions, data exclusions, and how we 
determined our sample sizes (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). The scenarios used for 
all studies are reported throughout the main text and can additionally be accessed all at once 
in the Supplementary Online Material (SOM). 
   
Study 1a 
Idea versus Labor Valuation in Adults 
 We designed Study 1a to explore the previously observed idea-valuation effect among 
young children in an adult sample. We closely followed the procedure by Li and colleagues 
(2013) and adapted the material to an online data-collection context with adult participants 
(e.g., we refrained from using dolls). We used a scenario (Li et al., 2013, Study 3) in which 
two targets are involved in the creation of a picture, and participants judgeÑon the basis of 
the targetsÕ individual contributionsÑwho should own the picture. In addition to this 
ownership measure (i.e., ownership condition), we implemented a second condition in which 
we instead asked participants how much money each of the targets deserves for their 
individual contributions to the picture (i.e., money condition). This extended the previously 
used ownership measure to the realm of resource allocations, thus operationalizing Òtype of 
valuationÓ in two different ways.  
 Finally, we developed a new questionnaire assessing individual differences in idea-
valuation and labor-valuation tendencies that we included as a metric predictor in the current 
study. We included this novel scale for two main reasons: first, it comprises items that assess 
both idea and labor valuation independently from a specific context or domain, thus providing 
a novel measure of domain-general valuation of ideas and labor. Second, the scale might 
provide evidence for the external validity of the scenario used in the current study, as well as 
some of the subsequent studies (i.e., Studies 1b, 1c, 2, and 3a). Specifically, if scores on this 
novel scale meaningfully predicted participantsÕ reactions to the idea/labor scenario, this 
Ideas versus Labor 10 
would indicate that these reactions were not entirely driven by a general response bias (e.g., 
always prefer the first agent mentioned) or other individual differences (e.g., preference for 
fairness and equal valuations). Instead, the idea/labor valuation scale might provide some 
external validation that the scenario used is at least to some degree sensitive to variations in 
participantsÕ general tendencies to value ideas and labor, respectively. 
 We a priori considered our first study to be explorative. However, we anticipated that 
individual differences in idea and labor valuation, as assessed by our newly designed 
questionnaire, would emerge as meaningful predictors of ownership judgments and resource 
allocations.  
Method 
Participants and design. We set sample size a priori to approximately n = 150 
participants per condition to achieve stable estimates for correlations between the idea and 
labor valuation questionnaire and the continuous as well as binary dependent measures 
(Schnbrodt & Perugini, 2013). We recruited 303 English-speaking adults via AmazonÕs 
online data-collection service Mechanical Turk (MTurk).1 Participants received $0.30 as 
compensation for completing the study (duration: less than five minutes). A total of 33 
participants (ownership condition: 10; money condition: 23)2 were excluded from analyses 
based on an attention-check item (see below), leaving a final sample of 270 participants (108 
females, 162 males, Mage = 33.68, SD = 10.82).  
Participants were randomly assigned to either make an ownership judgment (i.e., 
ownership condition; n = 142) or to allocate money between idea giver and laborer (i.e., 
money condition; n = 128). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For all MTurk studies, we applied filter criteria to increase data quality. Specificially, these criteria were an 
approval rate of 95% or higher, and location only United States. Where necessary, we additonally employed 
qualifications that prevented MTurk participants from participating in multiple studies that included the same or 
highly similar measures (Chandler, Paolacci, Peer, Mueller, & Ratliff, 2015). Please refer to Buhrmester, 
Kwang, and Goslin (2011), Hauser and Schwarz (2016), and Peer, Vosgerau, and Acquisti (2014), for a more 
detailed discussion of data quality for studies involving MTurk samples.  
2 Due to an unequal distribution of these exclusions across experimental conditions, χ2 (1) = 5.84, p = .016, Φc= 
.14, we repeated all key analyses across the raw data, that is, including all 303 participants. Results remained 
virtually identical (see SOM, for details).!
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Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to read a short scenario. 
Participants in the ownership condition saw the vignette from Li and colleagues (2013, Study 
3, p. 42): ÒSally and Anna are making a picture. Sally thinks of an idea for the picture, and 
she tells Anna how to make it. Then, Anna makes the picture. Sally and Anna fight over who 
gets to take the picture home.Ó Next, participants were asked ÒWhat do you think: Who 
should get the picture?Ó Participants gave a binary response (i.e., Sally or Anna). In the money 
condition, we made some modifications to the original vignette (in italics) so that it read as 
follows: ÒSally and Anna are making a picture. Sally thinks of an idea for the picture, and she 
tells Anna how to make it. Then, Anna makes the picture. It turns out that a mutual friend of 
theirs really likes the picture and offers to pay 1700 USD to buy it.Ó Next, these participants 
were asked ÒWhat do you think: Who deserves how much money?Ó Participants gave 
responses in two textboxes, one for Sally and one for Anna. In case of numerical responses 
that did not add up to the total of 1700, participants received an error message and were 
prompted to correct their response.  
Next, all participants were asked whether Anna or Sally came up with the idea for the 
picture. This item served as an attention check. Finally, participants completed the newly 
developed questionnaire assessing idea/labor valuation (i.e., ILV questionnaire). The ILV 
questionnaire included six items (e.g., ÒIdeas are a dime a dozen. ItÕs the execution of ideas 
that is valuableÓ, ÒContributing original ideas to a project is more worthy of reward than 
contributing labor for their executionÓ; see Table 1 for all items). Responses were given on a 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Results 
 Ownership. Responses to the ownership item were coded such that high values reflect 
idea valuation (1 = idea giver; 0 = laborer). Following Siegel (1956), for all studies involving 
this binary ownership measure, we performed binomial tests assuming large samples and 
correcting for continuity. In all cases, we tested the observed frequencies against an expected 
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frequency of P = .50 (i.e., equal distribution). Contrary to what has been found for children 
(Li et al., 2013), for adults, we did not find an idea-valuation effect, but a clear labor-
valuation effect. Specifically, a binomial test revealed that a majority 71.83% (n = 102/142) 
of participants in the ownership condition thought that the laborer should own the picture, 
whereas only 28.27% (n = 40/142) of participants thought that the idea giver should own the 
picture, z = 5.12 p < .001. 
 Money. For this and all subsequent studies involving the money-allocation measure, 
we first report the mean allocations for both idea giver and laborer, and then calculate the 
percentage of money allocated to the laborer to test this value against equal distribution (i.e., 
50%). Corroborating the effect on ascribed ownership, participants in the money condition 
thought that from a total of 1700 USD, the laborer (M = 1,048.97, SD = 294.49) deserves 
more money than the idea giver (M = 651.03, SD = 294.49). Consistently, the percentage of 
money allocated to the laborer (M = 61.70, SD = 17.32) was significantly higher than 50%, 
t(125) = 7.58, p < .001, CohenÕs d = 0.68, 95% CId [0.48; 0.87]. 
 ILV questionnaire. An exploratory, principal-component factor analysis with 
Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization produced two factors with Eigenvalues greater 
than 1, together explaining 70.69% of the total variance. The first factor comprises items that 
reflect a valuation of ideas, whereas the second factor comprises items that reflect a valuation 
of labor. Both factors were moderately correlated, r(270) = -.293, p < .001, 95% CIr [-.431; -
.159]. Factor loadings for the rotated solution can be found in Table 1. Consequently, we 
averaged responses to the three labor-valuation items (CronbachÕs α = .72) and the three idea-
valuation items (α = .85) to arrive at composite scores for labor valuation and idea valuation, 
respectively. 
Both labor valuation and idea valuation emerged as meaningful predictors of ownership 
judgments and money allocation decision, with each factor revealing unique explanatory 
power. Specifically, in a multiple logistic regression analysis (idea giver = 1, laborer = 0), the 
Ideas versus Labor 13 
labor-valuation facet emerged as a negative predictor of ascribed ownership to the idea giver, 
B = -.544, SE = .214, WaldÕs χ2 (1) = 6.48, p = .011, OR = 0.58, 95% CIOR [0.38; 0.88], 
whereas the idea-valuation facet emerged as a positive predictor of ascribed ownership to the 
idea giver, B = .521, SE = .203, WaldÕs χ2 (1) = 6.55, p = .010, OR = 1.68, 95% CIOR [1.13; 
2.51]. Similarly, in a linear regression analysis on the percentage of money allocated to the 
laborer, the labor-valuation facet emerged as a positive predictor, β = .355, SE = .080, t = 
4.43, p < .001, 95% CIβ [.203; .495], whereas the idea-valuation facet emerged as a negative 
predictor, β = -.269, SE = .081, t = -3.35, p = .001, 95% CIβ [-.416; -.116]. 
Table 1 







The real value of any creation is in the idea behind it, not the 
implementation. 
.886  
Contributing original ideas to a project is more worthy of 
reward than contributing labor for their execution. 
.862  
Ideas are more valuable than their mere execution. .855  
Ideas are overrated compared to the hard work needed for 
their implementation. 
 .836 
Ideas are a dime a dozen. ItÕs the execution of ideas that is 
valuable. 
 .835 
Most ÒnewÓ ideas usually already exist in some form. ItÕs 
solid implementation that is necessary to extract the value of 
any idea. 
 .677 
Notes. Rotated factor loadings for the six items comprising the idea/labor valuation questionnaire from Study 
1a. Factor loadings smaller than .4 are not displayed. 
 
Discussion 
In contrast to the idea valuation effect that Li and colleagues (2013) observed for 6-
year-olds employing an almost identical scenario, the results from this first exploratory study 
revealed a clear labor-valuation effect among adults. Specifically, we found that (a) adults 
were more likely to ascribe ownership of an artistic object to the person who actually made it 
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than to the person who came up with the idea, (b) adults favored the laborer over the idea 
giver by giving him or her more than 60% of the overall monetary compensation for the 
product, and (c) individual differences in general idea/labor valuation tendencies predicted the 
observed labor-valuation effect in meaningful ways.  
 
Study 1b 
Labor Valuation by Idea Givers and Idea Executors  
 We designed Study 1b to replicate the previously observed labor-valuation effect 
among adults and to examine its robustness. Specifically, we presented participants with the 
same scenario as in Study 1a and again asked them to allocate a certain amount of money to 
an idea giver and a laborer. Extending the previous study, in a between-subjects design, we 
additionally manipulated who the specific targets in this scenario were. Specifically, 
participants either imagined the two target persons from Study 1a (i.e., others-as-targets 
condition), themselves as idea giver and a friend of theirs as laborer (i.e., self-as-idea-giver 
condition), or themselves as laborer and a friend of theirs as idea giver (self-as-laborer 
condition). As individuals particularly value their own ideas (Ariely, 2010), introducing the 
self as idea giver represents a rather conservative test of the labor-valuation effect.  
 Therefore, we expected to replicate the labor-valuation effect in the conditions that 
either included two target persons or the self as laborer. In comparison, we anticipated that the 
labor-valuation effect might be attenuated in the condition that included the self as idea giver, 
potentially indicating a boundary condition for the effect observed thus far. 
Method 
Participants and design. Based on the effect sizes observed in the previous study and 
accounting for potential data exclusions, we set sample size a priori to a minimum of n = 60 
participants per condition. We recruited 203 English-speaking adults via MTurk. Participants 
received $0.30 as compensation for completing the study (duration: less than five minutes). 
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Eight participants were excluded from analyses because they failed an attention-check item 
(others-as-targets condition: 2; self-as-idea-giver condition: 4; self-as-laborer condition: 2). 
The final sample thus comprised 195 adults (83 females, 110 males, 2 other, Mage = 35.61, SD 
= 11.40).  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: others-as-targets 
condition (n = 66) versus self-as-idea-giver condition (n = 65) versus self-as-laborer 
condition (n = 64).  
Materials and procedure. Participants read the same scenario as in Study 1a, 
introducing an idea giver and a laborer, both of whom contributed to making a picture. 
Participants in the others-as-targets condition received the identical scenario from Study 1a, 
thus representing an exact replication of the money condition from that study. We only 
replaced the names with ÒPerson AÓ (formerly Sally, the idea giver) and ÒPerson BÓ (formerly 
Anna, the laborer), to account for a potential name-preference bias. Participants in the 
remaining two conditions received slightly modified versions of the picture scenario. 
Specifically, they read ÒYou and a friend are making a picture. You think of an idea for the 
picture and tell your friend how to make it. Then, your friend makes the picture.Ó (self-as-
idea-giver condition) and ÒYou and a friend are making a picture. Your friend thinks of an 
idea for the picture and tells you how to make it. Then, you make the picture.Ó (self-as-
laborer condition) In both conditions, this was followed by ÒIt turns out that a mutual friend 
of yours really likes the picture and offers to pay 1700 USD to buy it.Ó In the current study, 
all participants were asked to allocate 1700 USD between the idea giver and the laborer. In 
case of numerical responses that did not add up to the total of 1700, participants received an 
error message and were prompted to correct their response.  
Next, participants responded to an attention-check item and filled in the ILV 
questionnaire from the previous study. We again averaged responses to the three labor-
valuation items (α = .67, M =!4.08, SD =!1.16) and the three idea-valuation items (α = .81, M 
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= 3.62, SD = 1.18) to arrive at composite scores for labor valuation and idea valuation, 
respectively. In the current study, the two valuation tendencies were not significantly 
correlated, r(195) = -.085, p = .238, 95% CIr [-.286; .129]. 
Results 
 Money. Replicating the previous findings, participants overall allocated more money 
to the laborer (M = 953.30, SD = 271.14) than the idea giver (M = 746.70, SD = 271.14). 
Consistently, the mean percentage of money allocated to the laborer (M = 56.09, SD = 15.91) 
across all three conditions was significantly higher than 50%, t(194) = 5.35, p < .001, d = 
0.38, 95% CId [0.24; 0.53]. A one-way ANOVA on the mean percentage of money allocated 
to the laborer with Condition as between-factor did not reveal a significant main effect of 
Condition, F(2, 192) = 0.06, p = .939, ηp
2 = .001, indicating that the labor-valuation effect 
was obtained across all three conditions (Figure 1).  
 Consistent with our expectations, participants in the others-as-targets condition 
allocated more of the 1700 USD to the laborer (M = 945.91, SD = 206.32) than to the idea 
giver (M = 754.09, SD = 206.32). The mean percentage of money allocated to the laborer (M 
= 55.64, SD = 12.14) was significantly higher than 50%, t(65) = 3.78, p < .001, d = 0.46, 95% 
CId [0.21; 0.72], thus replicating the labor-valuation effect observed in the money condition 
from the previous study. Likewise, participants in the self-as-laborer condition favored 
themselves as laborers (M = 962.66, SD = 283.10) over their friend as idea giver (M = 737.34, 
SD = 283.10). The mean percentage of money allocated to the laborer (M = 56.63, SD = 
16.65) was again significantly higher than 50%, t(63) = 3.18, p = .002, d = 0.40, 95% CId 
[0.14; 0.65]. Even participants in the self-as-idea-giver condition allocated more money to the 
laborer (M = 952.31, SD = 315.37), represented by their friend, than to themselves (M = 
747.69, SD = 315.37). The mean percentage of money allocated to the laborer (M = 56.02, SD 
= 18.55) was again significantly higher than 50%, t(64) = 2.62, p = .011, d = 0.32, 95% CId 
[0.07; 0.57].  
Ideas versus Labor 17 
 
 
Figure 1. Allocated profit in USD (range from 0-1700) as a function of target person (laborer vs. idea giver) and 
perspective condition. Half of the endowment (i.e., 850 USD) is specified at the vertical dotted line. Error bars 
represent 95% CIs of mean proportions (Study 1b). 
 
ILV Questionnaire. Replicating the previous study, both valuation tendencies again 
emerged as meaningfulÐÐalbeit non-significantÐÐpredictors of money allocation. Specifically,!
in a linear regression analysis across all three conditions on the mean percentage of money 
allocated to the laborer, individual differences in labor valuation again emerged as a positive 
predictor, β = .132, SE = .071, t = 1.85, p = .066, 95% CIβ [-.035; .310], whereas individual 
differences in idea valuation emerged as a negative predictor, β = -.123, SE = .071, t = -1.72, 
p = .087, 95% CIβ [-.273; .011]. No significant interaction between valuation tendencies and 
Condition emerged, F(2, 192) = 1.58, p = .208, ηp
2 = .016, indicating that both valuation 
tendencies predicted money allocation similarly across conditions. 
Discussion 
Taken together, the present study replicated the findings of Study 1a, suggesting that 
adult participants valued the contribution of a laborer more than that of an idea giver. 
Remarkably, participants allocated more money to the laborer even when they themselves 
imagined to have contributed the idea to a mutual outcome. Lastly, participantsÕ valuation 
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tendencies as measured by the ILV questionnaire again predicted the observed labor-valuation 
effect in a theoretically plausible wayÐÐalbeit not significantly so.3 
 
Study 1c  
Labor Valuation among Experts 
 Building on the findings from the first two studies, we sought to replicate the labor-
valuation effect one more time in a different population. We were able to obtain data from 
trained legal professionals, mostly working as judges at a civil court. Assuming that a training 
in civil law would sensitize judges to matters of intellectual property and copyright issues 
(i.e., rights of idea givers), we suppose that such a sample would offer a rather conservative 
test of the previously observed labor-valuation effect. More generally, such expert samples 
are often recommended as being particularly well suited for conservative tests of judgment 
heuristics, as such biases can be potentially attenuated by expertise in the respective domain 
(Kruger et al., 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). We anticipated to replicate the previously 
observed labor-valuation effect, but we expected that the effect size might turn out to be 
somewhat smaller in the current expert sample. 
Method 
Participants and design. We could not determine sample size a priori due to the 
small number of available experts. The participating judges attended a conference on 
interview techniques and evaluation of witness statements in civil litigation at the German 
Judicial Academy (Deutsche Richterakdemie) in Wustrau, Germany.4 A total of 27 judges (9 
females, 17 males, 1 unspecified, Mage =  44.27, SD = 1.65) participated in this study. They 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In fact, when regressing the mean percentage of money allocated to the laborer on participantsÕ idea and labor 
valuation tendencies as measured by the ILV questionnaire only in the others-as-targets condition (i.e., the 
condition most closely resembling Study 1a), no significant relations emerged (labor-valuation scale: β = .028, 
SE = .119, t = 0.22, p = .825, 95% CIβ [-.218; .239]; idea-valuation scale: β = -.001, SE = .112, t = -0.01, p = 
.993, 95% CIβ [-.193; .149]). These analyses, however, are only based on a total of 66 participants, and sample 
size of the current study was not geared towards replicating these correlations in each of the experimental 
conditions individually. 
4 We thank (masked for review) for collecting these data for us. 
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were offered candy as compensation and took approximately ten minutes to work through all 
materials. Most of the judges (n = 18) indicated that they currently work at a civil court. 
Participants had an average of 15.46 years of work experience (SD = 10.41). All participants 
completed a booklet that included the idea/labor picture scenario from the previous studies. 
Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to take part in a study on 
Òcharacteristics of moral experts.Ó They worked through a booklet containing various 
questions related to another research project.5 At the end of this booklet, all participants saw 
the picture scenario from the previous studies. All participants completed two measures, one 
asking about ownership of the picture and one asking about allocation of money among the 
idea giver (Person A) and the laborer (Person B) (see Studies 1a and 1b). 
Results 
 Ownership. Responses to the ownership item6 were coded such that high values 
reflect labor valuation (0 = idea giver; 1 = laborer). Consistent with the results of Studies 1a 
and 1b, a labor-valuation effect emerged. Specifically, a binomial test revealed that the vast 
majority of 81.82% (n = 18/22) of the experts thought that the laborer should get to own the 
picture, whereas only a minority of 18.18% (n = 4/22) thought that the idea giver should get 
to own the picture, z = 2.77, p = .006. Due to the small sample size, we conducted an 
additional analysis, assuming small samples (recommended if N ≤ 25; Siegel, 1956): results 
remained virtually identical, p = .004. 
 Money. Consistent with the effect on ascribed ownership, participants thought that 
from a total of 1700 EUR, the laborer (M = 897.83, SD = 234.75) deserves more money than 
does the idea giver (M = 802.17, SD = 234.75). However, this difference was descriptively 
smaller than in our previous two studies and the mean percentage of money allocated to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Details about the preceding questions and the related research project can be obtained from the corresponding 
author. 
6 Five participants did not provide an answer. Unlike in the previous online studies, we could not prompt 
participants to provide an answer. 
Ideas versus Labor 20 
laborer (M = 52.83, SD = 13.03) was not significantly higher than 50%, t(25) = 1.11, p = .279, 
d = 0.22, 95% CId [-0.17; 0.60].
7 
Discussion  
 In sum, results from the current study provide additional support for the robustness of 
the previously established labor-valuation effect among adults. Particularly, even judicial 
experts evinced such a labor-valuation effect. These judges mostly worked at a civil court, 
thus we assumed that they were more familiar with matters of intellectual property and 
copyright law than lay people typically are. Nevertheless, a vast majority of the judges 
ascribed ownership of a mutual creation to the laborer. In the current study, the effect on 
allocations of money did not reach significance. This could be due to a weaker labor-
valuation effect among these experts or to reduced statistical power based on the very small 
ad hoc sample that was available. Considering the strong effect for ownership ascriptions, the 
small sample is likely to be the more probable explanation. The limitations of the current 
study notwithstanding, these results were obtained with a German-speaking adult expert 
sample, and the replication of the labor-valuation effect with respect to ownership ascriptions 
thus provides convergent evidence for the previously observed labor-valuation effect across 
different populations. 
 
Study 2  
Labor Valuation Across Contexts 
We designed Study 2 to extend the previous results in numerous ways: first, we sought 
to establish generalizability of the labor-valuation effect across different domains beyond art. 
To do so, we included various scenarios in addition to the picture scenario used in Studies 1a-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Four participants either did not provide any response or provided responses that did not add up to 1700 EUR. 
Unlike in the previous online studies, we could not prompt them to make sure that their allocations would add up 
to 1700. The reported mean allocations for idea giver and laborer are thus based on 23 participantsÐÐthat is, 
excluding both outliers and missing valuesÐÐ, whereas the mean percentage of money allocated to the laborer is 
based on responses from 26 participants, thus retaining all but one participant with missing values. 
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1c. Second, we explored three psychological judgments as potential predictors of the labor-
valuation effect. Specifically, we assessed judgments of importance, responsibility, and effort 
with regard to the contributions of an idea giver and a laborer, respectively. Third, on an 
exploratory basis, we examined whether the labor-valuation effect shows meaningful 
associations with established dispositional variables. We included two individual-differences 
measures that are conceptually related to the valuation of ideas and labor and may thus predict 
the observed labor-valuation effect. These were creative identity, that is, peopleÕs perception 
of creativity being a central part of Òwho they areÓ (Farmer, Tierney, & McIntyre, 2003; see 
also Vincent & Kouchaki, 2016) and protestant work ethic, reflecting individual differences in 
the valuation of Òhard workÓ and frugality (Maes & Schmitt, 2001; see also Furnham, 1990).  
We expected to replicate the previously observed labor-valuation effect across 
different domains. We additionally expected that such a labor-valuation effect would be 
reflected in participantsÕ judgments of perceived importance, responsibility, and effort 
attributed to the laborer (vs. the idea giver). Finally, we anticipated that participants with a 
strong creative identity would show an attenuated labor-valuation effect, whereas participants 
with a strong protestant work ethic would evince an amplified labor-valuation effect. 
Method 
Participants and design. In an attempt to generalize our findings to various 
populations, in the current study, we recruited a German-speaking online student sample. We 
contacted participants who were registered in an online database. We aimed for 
approximately N = 250 participants to be able to detect a small to moderate effect (correlation 
between dispositional predictors and labor valuation) with 80% power and a two-tailed test. A 
total of 261 participants completed the study. Participants were given the opportunity to enroll 
in a lottery for gift cards (total of ten gift cards of €20,00 [≈ $24,00] each) as compensation 
(duration: approximately ten minutes). Data from twelve participants were excluded from 
analyses, because these participants either failed an attention check, or they participated more 
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than once (in which case the second data set was discarded). The final sample thus comprised 
249 participants (181 females, 63 males, 5 other, Mage = 27.70, SD = 5.92). All participants 
saw the identical materials in the sequence described below. 
Materials and procedure. Participants first saw a series of five short scenarios, 
consecutively presented on the screen. Similar to the picture scenario from the previous 
studies, participants always learned that two target individuals were involved in a mutual 
creation process, wherein one person was introduced as the idea giver and the other person as 
the laborer. Unlike in the original picture scenario by Li and colleagues (2013), we omitted 
the reference to the idea giver Òtelling the laborer what to do,Ó because we were also 
interested in participantsÕ unbiased perceptions of responsibility (see General Discussion, for 
a more detailed consideration of this potential confound). The five scenarios captured the 
following domains: movies, books, internet start-ups, art works, and cooking (for complete 
wordings, see Table 2).  
For each scenario, on a scale from 1 (Person A; i.e., idea giver) to 7 (Person B; i.e., 
laborer), we asked participants to indicate who was more important for the respective project, 
who had more responsibility, and who put more effort into it. Subsequently, for each scenario, 
participants learned that the respective creation (e.g., the business or the art work) had been 
sold. They were then asked to indicate, in percentages, what share of the profit they would 
allocate to the idea giver and the laborer, respectively. Participants received an error message 
in case that their estimates did not add up to 100 percent.  
Upon completion of the five scenarios, participants proceeded to a six-item 
questionnaire assessing their creative identity that we adapted from previous research to the 
current student sample (Farmer et al., 2003). Sample items read ÒI often think about being 
creativeÓ and ÒI only have a vague concept of myself as a creative personÓ (reversed) (α = .90, 
M = 4.21, SD = 1.48) (see Appendix). Finally, participants completed a ten-item questionnaire 
measuring protestant work ethic (Maes & Schmitt, 2001), containing items such as ÒThrough 
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hard work one becomes a better personÓ and ÒHard work builds the characterÓ (α = .80, M = 
3.91, SD = 0.96) (see Appendix). Participants responded to items of both measures on scales 
from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (completely agree). Both measures were not significantly 
correlated, r(249) = -.067, p = .295, 95% CIr [-.191; .063]. Finally, towards the end of the 
study and embedded in an unrelated questionnaire, participants saw an attention-check item as 
previously used.  
Results 
 Our analytic approach focused on participantsÕ responses to the newly developed 
idea/labor valuation scenarios (i.e., profit allocated to the laborer as measure of valuation). 
We then examined whether and how the psychological judgments (importance, responsibility, 
and effort) predicted any valuation tendency. Finally, we explored whether and how creative 
identity and protestant work ethic were related to any valuation tendency. Given a relatively 
high number of measures in this study, and to allow for a more concise presentation of the 
results, we collapsed across scenarios and report results for individual scenarios in Table 2. 
Additionally, we employed multi-level modeling to account for variance between the 
scenarios. 
Idea/labor valuation scenarios. Analyses again focused on the mean percentage of 
profit allocated to the laborer. Across all scenarios (α = .56; see Table 2, for individual 
statistics), participants again preferred the laborer (M = 60.36, SD = 9.29) over the idea giver 
(M = 39.64, SD = 9.29) when allocating profits. Participants thus allocated approximately one 
fifth of the profit more to the laborer than to the idea giver. Consistently, the mean percentage 
of profit allocated to the laborer was significantly higher than 50%, t(248) = 17.59, p < .001, d 
= 1.12, 95% CId [0.96; 1.27]. All scenarios with the exception of the movie scenario produced 
highly significant labor-valuation effects (all ts ≥ 8.46, ps < .001, ds ≥ 0.54)ÐÐthe movie 
scenario revealed a non-significant pattern in the predicted direction, t(248) = 1.78, p = .077, 
d = 0.11, 95% CId [-0.01; 0.24].  
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To account for the variance between the scenarios, we conducted an additional test of 
the labor-valuation effect by fitting a cross-classified multi-level model. We fitted an empty 
model with participantsÕ profit allocation to the laborer as the dependent variable. We 
included a random intercept at the level of participants and scenarios (Judd, Westfall, & 
Kenny, 2012). The estimate of the modelÕs intercept indicated that the profit allocated to the 
laborer was significantly higher than 50% (intercept = 60.36, t[4.13] = 2.92, p = .042), 
supporting the results obtained with a one-sample t-test. 
 Psychological judgments. ParticipantsÕ relative judgments of perceived importance, 
responsibility, and effort with regard to each scenario resembled the pattern observed for 
allocations of profits. We again collapsed responses across scenarios (i.e., alphas denote 
reliabilities across scenarios). Values greater than 4 reflect relative ascriptions to the laborer, 
whereas values below 4 reflect relative ascriptions to the idea giver. Values were tested 
against the neutral mid-point of the scale (i.e., 4). Across scenarios, participants judged the 
laborer to be more important than the idea giver (α = .53, M = 4.13, SD = 0.79, t[248] = 2.66, 
p = .008, d = 0.17, 95% CId [0.04; 0.29]), they thought that the laborer had more 
responsibility than the idea giver (α = .66, M = 5.21, SD = 0.82, t[248] = 23.42, p < .001, d = 
1.48, 95% CId [1.30; 1.66]), and they perceived the laborer to have invested more effort into 
the project than the idea giver (α = .64, M = 5.06, SD = 0.80, t[248] = 21.05, p < .001, d = 
1.33, 95% CId [1.16; 1.50]). All three judgment dimensions were positively and significantly 
correlated (rs ranged from .136 to .379). Details for each scenario can be found in Table 2. 
We repeated these analyses using multi-level modeling. The results showed that participants 
judged the laborer to have more responsibility (intercept = 5.21, t[4.97] = 8.62, p < .001), to 
have invested more effort into the project (intercept = 5.07, t[4.29] = 4.87, p = .007) but to be 
equally important as the idea giver (intercept = 4.13, t[4.15] = 0.50, p = .64). 
 We next simultaneously regressed the mean percentage of profit allocated to the 
laborer on all three judgment dimensions. This analysis revealed that perceived importance (β 
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= .267, SE = .044, t = 6.13, p < .001, 95% CIβ [.161; .378]), responsibility (β = .320, SE = 
.047, t = 6.86, p < .001, 95% CIβ [.212; .426]), as well as effort (β = .455, SE = .045, t = 
10.09, p < .001, 95% CIβ [.336; .581]) all emerged as significant positive predictors of the 
observed labor-valuation effect, with effort ascriptions having the greatest predictive power 
(βeffort > βresponsibility, Z = 2.07, p = .039; βeffort > βimportance, Z = 2.99, p = .003; βresponsibility = 
βimportance, Z = 0.82, p = .412, all two-tailed). A multi-level analysis confirmed that effort (β = 
.390, SE = .021) indeed had a greater predictive power than did importance (β = .301, SE = 
.020), Z = 3.07, p = .002, and responsibility (β = .260, SE = .020), Z = 4.48, p < .001, which 
again did not differ, Z = 1.45, p = .147. 
Dispositional predictors. We regressed the mean percentage of profit allocated to the 
laborer simultaneously on both creative identity and protestant work ethic. This analysis 
revealed that protestant work ethic emerged as a positive predictor (β = .134, SE = .063, t = 
2.11, p = .036, 95% CIβ [.004; .255]), whereas creative identity was unrelated to profit 
allocations (β = -.039, SE = .063, t = -0.62, p = .537, 95% CIβ [-.160; .086]). The same results 
were obtained using a multi-level analysis (protestant work ethic: b = 1.30, p = .033; creative 
identity: b = -0.25, p = .527). 
Discussion 
Taken together, results from this study attested to the robustness of the labor-valuation 
effect across numerous artistic and non-artistic contexts as well as different populations. 
Extending the previous studies (Study 1a and 1b: MTurk samples; Study 1c: sample of 
professional German judges), the current study found support for a labor-valuation effect 
within a German student sample across five different scenarios. Additionally, perceptions of 
the laborer (vs. the idea giver) as important, responsible and having invested effort into the 
mutual creation determined allocation of profits. Importantly, although all three psychological 
judgments positively predicted relative profit allocations to the laborer, perceived effort seems 
to be of particular relevance. This was substantiated by comparing the predictive power of the 
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three psychological judgments tested in the current study. Results indicated that perceived 
effort consistently yielded the greatest predictive effect on labor-valuation tendencies. In 
addition, previous literature corroborates the notion that valuation judgments are determined 
by perceived effort (Kruger et al., 2004; Inzlicht et al., 2018). Therefore, in the next studies, 
we focus on perceived effort as a potential psychological explanation for the labor-valuation 
effect.  
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Table 2  
Study 2: Results for individual idea/labor scenarios 
 Importance Responsibility Effort Profit 
Scenario #1: movie 
Person A thinks of a story for a movie. 










Scenario #2: book 
Person A thinks of a story for a book. 








Scenario #3: start-up 
Person A thinks of a business plan for a new internet start-up. 








Scenario #4: picture 
Person A has the idea for a picture. 










Scenario #5: multi-course menu 
Person A thinks of a recipe for a multi-course menu. 










Notes. Results for each of the five idea/labor scenarios from Study 2. Scenario texts were translated from German. Judgments of importance, responsibility, 
and effort were indicated on seven-point scales (1 = Person A, 7 = Person B). Values below 4 indicate stronger ascriptions to the idea giver, whereas values 
above 4 indicate stronger ascriptions to the laborer. Values were tested against the mid-point of the scale (i.e., 4). Allocations of profits were indicated in 
percentages for both Person A and Person B. Values represent the mean percentage of profit allocated to the laborer for each scenario, which was tested 
against equal distribution (i.e., 50%). Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
 
Ideas versus Labor 28 
Study 3a  
Labor Valuation and Perceived Effort 
 Having established a robust labor-valuation effect across multiple domains and 
different populations, we next turn to a potential psychological mechanism behind this effect. 
Based on the notion that people rely on effort to infer quality (Kruger et al., 2004; Inzlicht et 
al., 2018), and based on the previous study that suggested perceived effort as a strong 
predictor of labor valuation, we contend that valuing labor over ideas might be the result of 
overestimating effort attributed to the laborer and underestimating effort attributed to the idea 
giver. Following a statistical mediation approach, we designed the current study to test this 
possibility. In addition, we implemented a new experimental manipulation: some participants 
made valuation judgments only with regard to the laborer (i.e., laborer-focus condition), 
whereas other participants made valuation judgments only with regard to the idea giver (i.e., 
idea-giver-focus condition), in an otherwise identical scenario. This allowed us to gain 
converging support for a labor-valuation effect across within- and between-subjects study 
designs.  
 Mirroring our previous studies, we predicted a main effect of our new manipulation 
such that valuation scores for the laborer would be greater than for the idea giver. 
Additionally, we expected participants to attribute more effort to the laborer than to the idea 
giver, which in turn should mediate the effect of the experimental manipulation on valuation 
scores. 
Method 
Participants and design. Based on previously observed effect sizes, we intended to 
recruit approximately n = 100 participants per between condition. We collected data from 199 
adults via MTurk. Participants received $0.30 as compensation for completing the study 
(duration: less than five minutes). Based on a manipulation-check item, 37 participants 
needed to be excluded from analysis (laborer-focus condition: 26; idea-giver-focus condition: 
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11),8 leaving a final sample of 162 participants (74 females, 88 males, Mage = 35.73, SD = 
11.77).  
Participants were randomly assigned to either a laborer-focus condition (n = 74) or an 
idea-giver-focus condition (n = 88).  
Materials and procedure. Participants saw the same scenario as in Study 1b (others-
as-targets condition). However, depending on condition, either the laborer or the idea giver 
was rendered salient. Specifically, participants in the laborer-focus condition read that	“John 
and a friend are making a picture. JohnÕs friend thinks of an idea for the picture and tells John 
how to make it. Then, John makes the picture. John and his friend fight over who gets to take 
the picture home.Ó Conversely, participants in the idea-giver-focus condition read that ÒJohn 
and a friend are making a picture. John thinks of an idea for the picture and tells his friend 
how to make it. Then, JohnÕs friend makes the picture. John and his friend fight over who gets 
to take the picture home.Ó Thus, we manipulated between participants whether the focal target 
person (i.e., John) was either the laborer or the idea giver.  
Subsequently, all participants estimated the degree of effort that John had put into the 
creation process. Specifically, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), they indicated 
their agreement with three items, keeping in mind JohnÕs contribution: ÒJohn invested a lot of 
effortÓ, ÒJohn spent quite some timeÓ, and ÒJohn really exerted himselfÓ. These items served 
as our measure of perceived effort (Kruger et al., 2004). Responses to the three effort items 
were collapsed (α = .94, M = 4.30, SD = 1.55).  
																																																								
8 Exclusions were based on a manipulation-check item asking participants who of the two target persons came 
up with the idea for the picture (i.e., John vs. JohnÕs friend). Because the wording of this item emphasized the 
contribution of the idea giver as the focal agent, participants in the laborer-focus condition (26/100 = 26.0%) 
might have been more likely to confuse the laborer with the idea giver than participants in the idea-giver-focus 
condition (11/99 = 11.1%), χ2 (1) = 7.29, p = .007, Φc= .19. For the latter, the focal agent (i.e., John) was also 
described as the idea giver, whereas for the former, the idea giver corresponded to the non-focal agent (i.e., 
JohnÕs friend). To rule out that participants were generally less attentive in the laborer-focus condition, we 
repeated all key analyses across the raw data, that is, including all 199 participants. Results remained virtually 
identical (see SOM, for details). 
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Next, participants were asked whether John should get the picture (binary response 
format: yes vs. no). Again, to complement the ownership measure, all participants then 
learned Ò[É] that a mutual friend of theirs really likes the picture and offers to pay 1700 USD 
to buy it.Ó They were asked how much of the money they thought John deserved (open 
response format; allowed values ranged from 0 to 1700). Finally, participants responded to 
the manipulation-check item described earlier. 
Results 
Labor-valuation effect. Responses to the ownership item were coded such that high 
values reflected greater ownership ascriptions to the target person John. Consistent with a 
labor-valuation effect, participants in the laborer-focus condition (60/74 = 81.10%) were more 
than twice as likely to ascribe ownership to John as were participants in the idea-giver-focus 
condition (32/88 = 36.40%), χ2 (1) = 32.76, p < .001, Φc= .45. Participants in the laborer-
focus condition (M = 1079.41, SD = 321.64) also allocated significantly more money to John 
than did participants in the idea-giver-focus condition (M = 697.16, SD = 369.99), t(160) = 
6.95, p < .001, d = 1.10, 95% CId [0.76; 1.43]. Allocations in the laborer-focus condition were 
significantly higher than what would be expected if the money was distributed equally among 
laborer and idea giver (i.e., 850 USD for each), t(73) = 6.14, p < .001, d = 0.71, 95% CId 
[0.46; 0.97], whereas allocations in the idea-giver-focus condition were significantly lower 
than such an equal distribution, t(87) = -3.88, p < .001, d = -0.41, 95% CId [-0.63; -0.19]. 
ParticipantsÕ ownership ascriptions and their money allocations were significantly correlated, 
r(162) = .532, p < .001, 95% CIr [.404; .639]. Hence, for the subsequent mediational analysis, 
we z-transformed and collapsed both measures such that high values reflect greater overall 
valuation. 
Effort as mediator. Consistent with our expectations, when John was described as the 
laborer (M = 5.22, SD = 1.14), participants ascribed to him greater effort than when he was 
described as the idea giver (M = 3.54, SD = 1.44) of the project, t(159.38) = 8.29, p < .001, d 
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= 1.31, 95% CId [0.97; 1.65]. We next tested a mediation model wherein participantsÕ 
perception of JohnÕs effort mediated the effect of our focus manipulation (whether John was 
laborer or idea giver) on the overall valuation of JohnÕs contribution (see Figure 2). 
Controlling for perceived effort reduced the direct effect of the focus manipulation (0 = idea-
giver focus; 1 = laborer focus) on valuation (without the mediator: β = .532, SE = .067, t = 
7.95, p < .001, 95% CIβ [.383; .669]), though it was still significant (with the mediator: β = 
.326, SE = .074, t = 4.42, p < .001, 95% CIβ [.175; .478]). Consistently, a bias-corrected 
bootstrapping analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) revealed that the indirect effect through 
perceived effort was significant, b = .216, SE = .049, 95% CIb [.118, .313]. 
Discussion 
Taken together, this study replicated the previously observed labor-valuation effect 
among adults. In the current study, we used a new between-subjects manipulation that 
prompted participants to provide judgments about either the idea giver or the laborer. 
Additionally, the current findings revealed that perceived effort partially explained why 
participants valued labor over ideas: the laborerÕs contribution was perceived to have been 
more effortful, which in turn increased its valuation relative to that of the idea giver.  
 
 
Figure 2. Mediational model wherein perceived effort underlies the effect of focus condition on valuation 
tendencies. Numbers represent standardized regression coefficients; numbers in parentheses represent 
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Study 3b  
Labor Valuation and Manipulated Effort 
 In this study, we experimentally manipulated perceived effort to gain additional 
support for its causal role in explaining the labor-valuation effect. After all, participants might 
value labor for other reasons and this higher valuation could have made them ascribe a higher 
effort to the laborer. Therefore, we created two different scenarios in which either the laborer 
or the idea giver was described as having invested most effort into a joint project.  
 We expected that increasing perceptions of effort invested by the idea giver (vs. the 
laborer) would significantly attenuate the previously observed labor-valuation effectÐÐthus 
testing our process by manipulating the mediator. To explore whether labor valuation can be 
considered a default, we also included a baseline condition for comparison purposes in which 
we did not explicitly mention how much effort idea giver or laborer invested into the mutual 
creation.  
Method 
Participants and design. In this study, we again recruited German-speaking students 
registered in an online database. We aimed for approximately n = 100 participants per 
between condition to be able to detect medium-sized effects. A total of 367 participants 
completed the study. Participants were again given the opportunity to enroll in a lottery for 
gift cards as compensation (total of ten gift cards of €20,00 [≈ $24,00] each). One participant 
in the baseline condition failed an attention check and was thus excluded from analyses, 
leaving a final sample of 366 participants (268 females, 95 males, 3 other, Mage = 26.95, SD = 
5.64).  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three between-subjects conditions: 
effort-laborer condition (i.e., laborer invested more effort than idea giver; n = 125), effort-
idea-giver condition (i.e., idea giver invested more effort than laborer; n = 124), or baseline 
condition (no mention of effort; n = 117). 
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Materials and procedure. Similar to previous studies, participants again learned 
about two target persons, artist A and artist B. Artist A (idea giver) was described as having 
had an idea for a painting, and then telling artist B (laborer) how to make it. Artist B then 
made the painting. Unlike in the previous scenarios, the present scenario presented crucial 
additional information and a photo of an actual painting (see Appendix). Participants in the 
baseline condition then learned the title of the painting, and how artist A came up with the 
idea for it, as well as how artist B made it (translations of these descriptions can be found in 
the Appendix). This context provided us with the opportunity to increase or decrease the 
effort invested by the idea giver and the laborer. Following Kruger and colleagues (2004), we 
chose time invested as a proxy for effort invested. Specifically, participants in the effort-
laborer condition additionally read that artist A (idea giver) invested 4 hours to develop the 
idea for the painting, whereas artist B (laborer) invested 26 hours to make the painting. 
Contrary, participants in the effort-idea-giver condition additionally learned that artist A (idea 
giver) invested 26 hours to develop the idea for the painting, whereas artist B (laborer) 
invested 4 hours to make the painting.  
Similar to previous studies, all participants then learned that, upon completion, both 
artists fought over who actually owns the painting. Participants were asked to indicate who 
should be allowed to keep the painting (0 = artist A, idea giver or 1 = artist B, laborer). 
Additionally, they learned that later on, an art collector showed interest in the work and 
offered 1700 EUR to buy it. As in previous studies, participants indicated how much money 
the idea giver and laborer should receive.  
As a manipulation check, participants then answered two questions assessing 
perceived effort on a scale from 1 (artist A) to 7 (artist B). Specifically, these items read 
ÒWho invested more effort into the painting?Ó and ÒWho invested more time into the 
painting?Ó As expected, both items were significantly correlated, r(366) = .398, p < .001, 95% 
CIr [.299; .488], and thus collapsed into one score with higher values reflecting relatively 
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greater perceptions of effort ascribed to the laborer (M = 4.48, SD = 1.54). Finally, 
participantsÕ attention was assessed by having them indicate who came up with the idea for 
the painting (artist A or artist B). 
Results 
 Manipulation check. A univariate ANOVA confirmed that effort perceptions differed 
across conditions, F(2, 363) = 234.79, p < .001, ηp
2 = .56. Specifically, participants in the 
effort-laborer condition (M = 5.51, SD = 1.00) ascribed relatively more effort to the laborer 
than did participants in the effort-idea-giver condition (M = 2.86, SD = 1.14), t(247) = 19.53, 
p < .001, d = 2.48, 95% CId [2.14; 2.80], and participants in the baseline condition (M = 5.09, 
SD = 0.95), t(240) = 3.37, p = .001, d = 0.43, 95% CId [0.18; 0.69]. Participants in the 
baseline condition also ascribed relatively more effort to the laborer than did participants in 
the effort-idea-giver condition, t(239) = 16.46, p < .001, d = 2.12, 95% CId [1.80; 2.44]. 
 Ownership. A chi-square test confirmed that ownership ascriptions varied across 
conditions, χ2 (2) = 8.92, p = .012, Φc= .16 (Figure 3a). Once again confirming the labor-
valuation effect, a binomial test revealed that participants in the baseline condition were 
significantly more likely to ascribe ownership (0 = idea giver; 1 = laborer) to the laborer 
(70.09%, n = 82/117) than the idea giver (29.91%, n = 35/117), z = 4.25, p < .001. 
Participants in the effort-laborer condition evinced a similar labor-valuation effect, thus 
ascribing ownership preferably to the laborer (70.40%, n = 88/125) than the idea giver 
(29.60%, n = 37/125), z = 4.47, p < .001, whereas those in the effort-idea-giver condition 
showed no preference for either the laborer (54.47%, n = 67/123) or the idea giver (45.53%, n 
= 56/123), z = 0.90, p = .368.  
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Figure 3a. Ascriptions of ownership to the laborer and the idea giver in percentages as a function of effort-
salience condition. High values reflect stronger ownership ascription (Study 3b). 
 
Money. Participants again overall allocated more money to the laborer (M = 915.18, 
SD = 303.34) than the idea giver (M = 784.82, SD = 303.34). The mean percentage of money 
allocated to the laborer (M = 53.83, SD = 17.84) was again significantly higher than 50%, 
indicating a labor-valuation effect across conditions, t(365) = 4.11, p < .001, d = 0.21, 95% 
CId [0.11; .32].  
A univariate ANOVA confirmed that the mean percentage of money allocated to the 
laborer differed across conditions, F(2, 363) = 6.38, p = .002, ηp
2 = .03 (Figure 3b). 
Specifically, participants in the effort-laborer condition (M = 57.44, SD = 17.74) were more 
likely to prefer the laborer than were participants in the effort-idea-giver condition (M = 
49.55, SD = 17.43), t(247) = 3.54, p < .001, d = 0.45, 95% CId [0.20; 0.70], who, in turn, were 
less likely to prefer the laborer than were participants in the baseline condition (M = 54.52, 
SD = 17.58), t(239) = -2.20, p = .029, d = -0.28, 95% CId [-0.54; -0.03]. There was no 
significant difference between effort-laborer and baseline conditions, t(240) = 1.28, p = .201, 
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In line with the results for ascribed ownership, and indicating a default labor-valuation 
effect, participants in the baseline condition allocated relatively more money to the laborer 
than the idea giver, t(116) = 2.78, p = .006, d = 0.26, 95% CId [0.07; 0.44]. Similarly, 
participants in the effort-laborer condition displayed such a labor-valuation effect, t(124) = 
4.69, p < .001, d = 0.42, 95% CId [0.24; 0.60], whereas those in the effort-idea-giver condition 
showed no significant preference, t(123) = -0.29, p = .776, d = -0.03, 95% CId [-0.20; 0.15].  
 
 
Figure 3b. Allocated profit in EUR (range from 0-1700) as a function of target person (laborer vs. idea giver) 
and effort-salience condition. Half of the endowment (i.e., 850 EUR) is specified at the vertical dotted line. Error 
bars represent 95% CIs of mean proportions (Study 3b).  
 
Discussion 
Taken together, results from this study replicate the previously established labor-
valuation effect with new materials. Noteworthy, peopleÕs labor-valuation tendency did not 
significantly reverse under circumstances in which the idea giver invested considerably more 
time into a mutual project than did the laborer (i.e., 26 hours versus 4 hours). Specifically, 
instead of a significant reversal, raising the perceived effort of the idea giver eliminated the 
previously observed labor-valuation effect such that participants showed no preference for 
either laborer or idea giver. People thus seem to have a robust tendency associating effort 
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primarily with contributing labor and not with contributing ideas. Extending Study 3a, in 
which the mediator was measured, the current study manipulated perceptions of invested 
effort by the laborer and the idea giver. Furthermore, comparisons to a baseline condition 
revealed that labor valuation might be the default inclination, and that making the idea giverÕs 
effort salient can at least eliminate the labor-valuation effect, thus offering a tool to divert 
peopleÕs initial effort-valuation associations from labor to ideasÐÐeven though, this effort-
salience manipulation was still not strong enough to reverse the effect. 
 
Study 4  
Labor Valuation and Valence of Outcome 
 So far, our studies have consistently shown the labor-valuation effect when the joint 
product was a success. Accordingly, it seems that people give more praise to laborers than to 
idea givers. Do laborer also receive more blame when things go wrong and the joint product 
is a failure? Research has shown that perceived intentionality plays a particularly important 
role when explaining and evaluating negative outcomes (Morewedge, 2009; see also Knobe, 
2003). For example, perceivers are more likely to assume that a target person did something 
on purpose if that action entails negative (as opposed to positive) consequences (Knobe, 
2003). Similarly, people expect a human agent with intentions behind unfair offers in an 
ultimatum game, whereas they are more likely to expect a computer behind fair offers 
(Morewedge, 2009).  
 Assuming that people attribute the intention for a creation to the idea giver and not to 
the laborer, in the case of a negative outcome (e.g., product failure), the previously observed 
asymmetry might reverse. Specifically, due to the relatively greater relevance of perceived 
intentionality over perceived effort when blaming others for negative outcomes, people might 
generally praise laborers more than idea givers for a positive outcome, but blame idea givers 
more than laborers for a negative outcome. To examine this possible boundary condition, we 
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adapted a scenario from Study 2 and experimentally manipulated whether a mutual creation 
of an idea giver and a laborer was perceived as positive or negative by a third party. 
Additionally, we assessed how much effort participants ascribed to the laborer relative to the 
idea giver.  
 Drawing from the results of our previous studies, we expected participants to ascribe 
more effort to the laborer than to the idea giver. We also tested whether valence of outcome 
will moderate the effect of perceived effort on labor valuation. Specifically, we expected that 
ascriptions of effort to the laborer will be linked to stronger labor valuation (i.e., praise 
judgments) only in the case of positive outcomes. For negative outcomes (i.e., blame 
judgments), we did not expect such a relation, as for negative outcomes, intentions (ideas) 
should matter more than effort invested by the laborer. 
Method 
Participants and design. We again aimed for approximately n = 100 participants per 
between condition to be able to detect small-to-medium effects. A total of 221 adults 
completed the study via MTurk. Participants received $0.30 as compensation for completing 
the study (duration: less than five minutes). Based on attention checks, 27 participants were 
excluded (positive-outcome condition: 18; negative-outcome condition: 9)9, so that the final 
sample comprised 194 adults (102 females, 92 males, Mage = 36.31, SD = 11.89).  
Participants were randomly assigned to either a positive-outcome condition (n = 92) or 
a negative-outcome condition (n = 102). 
Materials and procedure. Participants read a short, newly designed scenario10 
adapted from Study 2, describing three target persons: Jesse, Alex, and Sam. Specifically, 
they learned that ÒTwo friends, Jesse and Alex want to surprise a mutual friend, Sam, with a 
																																																								
9 Even though twice as many participants were excluded from the positive-outcome condition compared to the 
negative-outcome condition, the distribution of these exclusions across experimental conditions did not 
significantly deviate from an equal distribution, χ2 (1) = 3.51, p = .061, Φc= .13. But because it almost did, we 
again repeated all key analyses across the raw data, that is, including all 221 participants. Results remained 
virtually identical (see SOM, for details). 
10 We thank (masked for review) for serving as idea giver for this scenario. 
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home-cooked meal. To do so, Jesse thinks of a recipe for the meal. Alex then goes ahead and 
cooks the meal.Ó On a scale from 1 (definitely Jesse) to 7 (definitely Alex), all participants 
were then asked to complete three rating items assessing perceived effort (i.e., ÒWho invested 
more effort?Ó, ÒWho spent more time?Ó, ÒWho really exerted him-/herself?Ó). Higher values 
thus reflect stronger effort ascription to the laborer over the idea giver. Responses to the 
perceived-effort items were collapsed (α = .86, M = 5.75, SD = 1.04).  
Depending on condition, some participants then read about a positive outcome of the 
mutual creation, whereas others read about a negative outcome. Specifically, those in the 
positive-outcome condition learned that ÒShortly thereafter, Sam arrives and tries the meal. It 
turns out that Sam really likes the food and finishes the whole dish, asking for more!Ó, 
whereas those in the negative-outcome condition learned that ÒShortly thereafter, Sam arrives 
and tries the meal. It turns out that Sam does not like the food at all, does not finish the dish 
and would never consider asking for more!Ó We then asked participants how much praise 
(positive-outcome condition) or how much blame (negative-outcome condition) Jesse and 
Alex deserved for the positive (negative) outcome, each on scales ranging from 1 (none at all) 
to 7 (a lot). Note that we assessed praise (blame) orthogonally for the idea giver (Jesse) and 
the laborer (Alex). Subsequently, all participants completed two manipulation-check items, 
one asking ÒWho had the idea for the recipe?Ó (Jesse versus Alex) and one asking ÒDid Sam 
enjoy the meal?Ó (Yes, Sam really liked the food versus No, Sam did not like the food at all). 
Results 
 Effort. As we assessed perceived effort on one scale ranging from 1 (idea giver) to 7 
(laborer), we tested whether the corresponding effort index was significantly higher than the 
mid-point of the scale (i.e., 4), indicating relative effort ascriptions to the laborer over the idea 
giver. Confirming previous results, participants overall ascribed more effort to the laborer 
than the idea giver, t(193) = 23.42, p < .001, d = 1.68, 95% CId [1.46; 1.90]. Perceived effort 
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did not differ a priori between the two outcome conditions, t(192) = 0.59, p = .558, d = 0.08, 
95% CId [-0.20; 0.37].  
 Valuation. We next conducted a mixed-model ANOVA with Outcome (negative vs. 
positive) as between-subjects factor and Target (idea giver vs. laborer) as within-subjects 
factor. This analysis revealed that participants overall gave higher praise judgments (M = 
5.23, SD = 0.88) for the positive outcome than they gave blame judgments (M = 3.93, SD = 
1.41) for the negative outcome, F(1, 192) = 57.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = .23. Participants overall 
also gave higher praise/blame judgments for the laborer (M = 4.84, SD = 1.81) than the idea 
giver (M = 4.26, SD = 1.66), F(1, 192) = 23.79, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11. Importantly, a significant 
interaction Condition × Target emerged, F(1, 192) = 84.88, p < .001, ηp
2 = .31 (Figure 4).  
 Specifically, in the case of a positive outcome, participants ascribed more praise to the 
laborer (M = 6.15, SD = 1.04) than the idea giver (M = 4.30, SD = 1.49), t(91) = 9.51, p < 
.001, d = 1.40, 95% CId [1.05; 1.75], whereas in the case of a negative outcome the reverse 
was true, as participants ascribed more blame to the idea giver (M = 4.22, SD = 1.80) than the 
laborer (M = 3.65, SD = 1.52), t(101) = 3.21, p = .002, d = 0.45, 95% CId [0.17; 0.73].  
 
 
Figure 4. Judgments of praise (positive-outcome condition) and blame (negative-outcome condition) on a seven-
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Regression-based moderation. In order to examine whether the previously observed 
effect of perceived effort on labor valuation would be moderated by outcome valence, we also 
ran a regression-based moderation analysis following the procedure outlined by Hayes (2013). 
Specifically, we included perceived effort as the predictor (X), the difference score of idea-
giver judgments subtracted from laborer judgments as the criterion (Y), and the outcome-
valence condition (-1 = negative outcome; +1 = positive outcome) as the moderator (M). This 
regression revealed a significant interaction effect Effort × Outcome on judgments, b = 0.62, 
SE = .11, t = 5.45, p < .001, 95% CIb [.40; .84]. For the positive outcome, perceived effort 
positively predicted relative praise ascribed to the laborer, b = 1.15, SE = .17, t = 6.90, p < 
.001, 95% CIb [.82; 1.48]. Contrary, for the negative outcome, there was no such relation 
between perceived effort and ascriptions of blame, b = -0.08, SE = .15, t = -0.55, p = .584, 
95% CIb [-0.39; 0.22].  
Discussion 
 In sum, results from our final study add to the previous findings in some important 
ways: first, they replicate the labor-valuation effect and extend it to a novel judgment domain 
(i.e., responsibility attribution). Second, they replicate the previously observed asymmetry 
between idea giver and laborer regarding effort perceptions. Third, they replicate the effect of 
this perceived effort on labor valuation. Fourth, the current findings extend the labor-
valuation effect to the realm of praise and blame judgments, indicating that outcome valence 
of a mutual creation between an idea giver and a laborer judged by a third party determines 
who people focus on when ascribing praise versus blame. Specifically, people again ascribed 
more praise to the laborer than to the idea giver when their creation was a success, while they 
ascribed more blame to the idea giver than the laborer when their creation was a failure. Thus, 
the current results indicate that perceived effort shaped participantsÕ valuation judgments only 
in the case of positive but not negative outcomes.  
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 However, the current operationalization of outcome valence might have been 
ambiguous to some degree. Specifically, we intended to manipulate whether the mutual 
creation had a positive (i.e., success) or a negative (i.e., failure) outcome. We did, however, 
not implicate any harm in the negative-outcome conditionÐÐthus, the negative outcome could 
also be construed as the absence of a positive outcome. Furthermore, in this condition, the fact 
that Sam (i.e., the third party evaluating the outcome) did not like the meal might have been 
due to a mismatch between his or her preferences and the idea for the recipe, resulting in 
greater blame ascriptions to the idea giver over the laborer. Had we described Sam as a 
mushroom enthusiast, and the idea for the recipe as a creative variation of SamÕs favorite 
mushroom dish, participants instead might have inferred that the negative outcome must have 
been caused by the laborerÕs poor execution of an otherwise flawless mushroom recipe, 
resulting in greater blame ascriptions to the laborer in the negative-outcome condition as well.  
 Because Sam was described as a mutual friend, however, we assumed that all three 
actors would be perceived as being familiar with each othersÕ preferences to some degree, 
such that a striking mismatch between the idea for the recipe and SamÕs preferences could 
indeed be interpreted as failure on behalf of the idea giverÐÐeither because the idea for the 
recipe was generally poor, or because it did not fit the context of SamÕs preferences. 
Nevertheless, more research is needed in order to explore these additional possibilities and 
further pinpoint the role of outcome valence on the observed labor-valuation effectÐÐan issue 
we will return to below. 
 
General Discussion 
 Are ideas cheap? Whereas children do not seem to think so (Li et al., 2013), the 
current research suggests that adults do. Despite the fact that people might generally value 
creativity (Ritter & Rietzschel, 2017), the current set of studies (k = 7; N = 1,463) suggests 
that adults seem to associate labor with greater observable effort, which in turn helps explain 
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why adults value labor over ideas. Specifically, when people learn that one person contributed 
the idea to make something, whereas another person contributed labor to make it, the laborer 
is appreciated substantially more than the idea giver. 
 We observed this labor-valuation effect for ascriptions of ownership over the mutual 
creation (Studies 1a, 1c, 3a, and 3b), allocation of money (Studies 1a, 1b, 2, 3a, and 3b), and 
judgments of praise to both contributing parties (Study 4). Attesting to the robustness of this 
finding, the labor-valuation effect emerged even when participants imagined themselves to 
have been the idea giver (Study 1b), and in a sample of experts (Study 1c). Finally, we 
observed labor valuation across different domains such as art, cooking, and business (Study 2) 
and across different populations such as U.S. American online samples (Studies 1a, 1b, 3a, 
and 4) as well as German students (Studies 2 and 3b) and German professional judges (Study 
1c).  
We have argued that adults might be inclined to rely on observable effort as a cue to 
determine how much they should value the idea giverÕs and the laborerÕs contribution (Kruger 
et al., 2004; Inzlicht et al., 2018). Consistent with this notion, our participants were indeed 
more inclined to perceive the laborer as having invested more effort into the mutual creation 
than the idea giver. This increased perception of effort, in turn, partially explained the labor-
valuation effect (Study 3a). Experimentally manipulating the salience of effort further attested 
to this explanation andÐÐvia comparison to a baseline conditionÐÐsuggested that valuation of 
labor might be the default judgment inclination (Study 3b). Finally, drawing from the 
literature on the role of intentionality in praise and blame judgments (Knobe, 2003; Pizarro et 
al., 2003), we documented a boundary condition of the labor-valuation effect: although 
participants praised the laborer more than the idea giver when their joint project was a 
success, the idea giver received most of the blame for a project failure, hence reversing the 
previously observed judgment asymmetry (Study 4).  
Generalizability of the Current Findings 
Ideas versus Labor 44 
 The noteworthy consistency of the labor-valuation effect in adults across different 
samples and operationalizations notwithstanding, the generalizability of this effect has 
certainly limits. Here, we discuss four potential boundary conditions in more detail: creativity 
versus non-creativity, skill and mastery, power and status, as well as cross-cultural 
differences.  
 Creativity versus non-creativity. The current research was partially motivated by 
developmental research that compared idea and labor valuation in children (Li et al., 2013). 
To explore this effect in adults, we conducted the initial studies with highly similar scenarios 
to increase comparability. In addition, we developed novel scenarios to generalize our 
findings across different domains (cf. Study 2). However, to varying degrees, most of these 
scenarios are situated in a creative context (e.g., art or cooking). Consistent with scenarios 
used in previous research, the creative context may provide a particularly prototypical 
example for collaborative work that requires both a creative idea and labor to execute it.  
 It should be acknowledged, however, that the distinction between idea giver and 
laborer, in general, might be less plausible in a non-creative context. There, the role of idea 
givers, providing the idea for a creation, might be less important in the first place, thus 
rendering the comparison to a laborer less meaningful. Consequently, valuation of labor might 
potentially even be more pronounced in such non-creative contexts. 
 Skill and mastery. As most of the scenarios reported here require the laborer to 
execute a creative idea (e.g., make a picture or cook a meal), a certain level of skill or mastery 
seems necessary for successfully doing so. Such perceptions of skill or mastery on behalf of 
the laborer, in turn, might contribute to participantsÕ tendency to value the laborerÕs 
contributions over the contribution of the idea giver. Likewise, idea givers might be perceived 
as less skilledÐÐor even incompetentÐÐ, because they do not execute their ideas themselves. 
We acknowledge that the scenarios used provide little information that participants could use 
to disambiguate these issues. 
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 Building on the present explanatory model, future research may examine the role of 
perceived skill or mastery and relate it to effort perceptions. Specifically, labor that requires a 
particularly high degree of mastery might also be associated with more effort than more 
simplistic kinds of labor. On the other hand, a very high level of mastery might be associated 
with an expert statusÐÐand experts sometimes seem to effortlessly master their work, thus 
leading to perceptions of enhanced mastery and low effort. In either case, a certain degree of 
skill and mastery might be a moderating variable, facilitating labor valuation.   
 Power and status. Moreover, is it possible that adult participants considered laborers 
as the less powerful, exploited party, thus feeling sympathy towards them, and assigning 
greater rewards to them in the service of restoring justice. However, we believe this to be 
rather unlikely. Previous research has instead shown that higher rewards are associated with 
agents who hold more (vs. less) power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Importantly, 
the present labor-valuation effect emerged regardless of whether the idea giver was described 
as being in charge and telling the laborer what to do (Studies 1a, 1b, 1c, 3a, and 3b; see also 
Li et al., 2013) or not (Studies 2 and 4).  
 Thus, the potential confound, that power and status may be mostly associated with 
idea givers who initiate and oversee the creation process (e.g., an employer delegating work) 
as opposed to laborers who merely execute the idea giversÕ orders (e.g., employees working 
towards the employerÕs goals), does not seem to explain the robust labor-valuation effect that 
we observed. 
 Cross-cultural differences. Finally, an important context feature that might moderate 
idea and labor valuation pertains to cross-cultural differences. We attempted to gather 
evidence for the labor-valuation effect across a wide range of populations, including U.S. 
American MTurk samples, German student samples, and German legal experts. Nonetheless, 
all of our samples are WEIRD samples, that is, Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  
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 As noted earlier, children dislike copycatsÐÐthereby showing an appreciation of 
original ideas over mere laborÐÐacross non-WEIRD cultures as well, for example, Mexico 
and China (Yang et al., 2014). Similarly, out of a variety of potential reasons for attributing 
ownershipÐÐincluding creation, familiarity, first contact, and equityÐÐthree- and five-year-old 
children consistently chose those as owners of an object who created it. These ownership 
intuitions emerged across children growing up in seven highly contrasted social, economic, 
and cultural circumstances, including regions within the USA, China, and Brazil (Rochat, 
Robbins, Passos-Ferreira, Oliva, Dias, & Guo, 2014).  
 Turning to adults, the general association between effort and value, in contrast to 
childrenÕs robust idea valuation, seems to be consistent across cultures to some degree as well 
(Inzlicht et al., 2018). However, work ethic, that is, the valuation of Òhard workÓ and frugality 
(Furnham, 1990) might differ between cultures, even independently from peopleÕs individual 
religious beliefs (Giorgi & Marsh, 1990). Taken together, peopleÕs tendency to associate labor 
with more effort, and in turn, effort with value, might vary in accordance with cultural belief 
systems, thereby moderating the relative valuation of labor over ideas. Future research on idea 
and labor valuation should thus include adult samples from non-WEIRD populations to 
further explore the boundaries of the present findings. 
Relation to Developmental Findings 
 Our results are at odds with the idea-valuation effect documented by Li and colleagues 
(2013). Whereas 4-year-old children did not favor either the idea giver or the laborer, 6-year-
old children consistently preferred ideas over labor and assigned ownership to an idea giver 
rather than a laborer. Adapting the basic experimental set-up for adult samples nevertheless 
resulted in a robust valuation of labor over ideas in our studies. Interestingly, the idea-
valuation effect among children emerged even though they themselves spent considerably 
more time in the labor condition than they did in the idea-giver condition (Li et al., 2013). 
While this observation is consistent with our adult participantsÕ intuition that contributing 
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labor is typically more effortful than contributing an idea, the increased effort associated with 
labor (vs. ideas) does not seem to drive childrenÕs valuation judgments. Consistently, the so-
called ÒIKEA effectÓ emerges at the age of five, but it seems to be mainly associated with the 
development of childrenÕs self-conceptÐÐhinting at the possibility that perceived effort might 
matter more to adults than young children (Marsh, Kanngiesser, & Hood, 2018). 
 Taken together, some of the features of these developmental studies are more 
consistent with idea valuation (i.e., the idea giver being described as in charge), whereas 
others seem more consistent with our account of labor valuation via increased effort 
perceptions (i.e., the time children spent contributing an idea versus labor). It could also be 
that children spend more time making a picture compared to coming up with an idea for a 
picture, but that they do not perceive the activity itself to be effortful. After all, children like 
to draw and make pictures or other artefacts. In order to test our effort-based account in a 
developmental context, one would need to either measure perceived effort across different 
activities that children engage in, or manipulate the salience of effort (see Study 3b) to 
determine whether children evince idea valuation mostly in domains in which they do not 
perceive labor as effortfulÐÐsuch as drawing or crafting.  
 An additional possibility might be grounded in different reward structures that young 
versus older idea givers and laborers typically experience: because children might not be such 
skilled laborers yet, people may praise them mostly for their ideas and their creativity, as 
opposed to their hard work. Contrary, adults may receive praise predominantly for labor and 
productivity (e.g., in work settings). Future developmental research might investigate idea and 
labor valuation in older children and adolescents who have (recently) entered secondary 
school, thereby extending Li and colleaguesÕ (2013) samples of 4- and 6-year-old children. 
The transition to secondary school might be accompanied with a stronger focus on 
achievement, hard work, and industriousness, resulting in a consequential shift within the 
reward structure, more closely resembling that of adults.  
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Contributions and Implications 
 Lay conceptions of creativity. The current account of effort-based depreciation of 
ideas might also relate to peopleÕs tendency to mystify the creative process and creativity 
more broadly (Baas, Koch, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2015; see Ritter & Rietzschel, 2017, for an 
overview). Particularly, precisely because perceivers cannot observe mental effort (i.e., 
generation of a creative idea) as much as they can observe physical effort (i.e., labor when 
executing an idea), lay people may downplay the role of effort in the creative process. 
Consistently, they seem to associate creative thinking with a state of mind that is 
characterized by rather superficial information processing and little attentional focus. They 
additionally seem to believe that creative ideas mainly emerge in contexts of mind wandering, 
incubation, and positive moods (Baas et al., 2015), thereby neglecting the mental effort that 
might have preceded any particular creative insight. Even the metaphors we use to describe 
the emergence of good ideas (e.g., as light bulbs) conform to the perception of good ideas 
appearing out of thin air and seemingly without prior effort (Elmore & Luna-Lucero, 2016).  
 As lay peopleÕs conceptions of what creativity is and how it works have tangible 
outcomes (OÕConnor, Nemeth, & Akutsu, 2013), it seems important to understand why and 
how precisely lay people mystify the creative process. The present account revolving around 
asymmetrical perceptions of effort associated with ideas and labor, may advance this 
understanding. 
 Outcome valence and morality. As Study 4 suggested, the preferential weighing of a 
laborerÕs over an idea giverÕs contribution is contingent upon the mutual creation having 
positive outcomes. For negative outcomes, we have observed a reversal of this asymmetry, 
such that people tend to blame the person who contributed the idea over the person who 
executed it. In addition, the current research documents that outcome valence moderates the 
relation between perceived effort and valuation tendencies such that only for positive 
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outcomes did effort predict praise judgments. For negative outcomes, however, effort was 
unrelated to blame judgments.  
 Future research might extend these initial results in the domain of outcome valence to 
the domain of morality. For instance, one might consider cases in which good or moral ideas 
are poorly executed as opposed to bad or immoral ideas that are well executed. Such research 
might inform us about peopleÕs intuitions about some of the most horrific ideas and intentions 
of human history such as the holocaust that was executed with cold-blooded efficiency by 
henchmen like Adolf Eichman. Many of them have tried to dilute their responsibility by 
referring to their status as mere ÒlaborersÓ in a dehumanizing system, just following orders of 
Òidea giversÓ and adhering to their laws (Arendt, 1963).  
 Practical implications. On a methodological note, our basic experimental paradigm 
adapted from previous research (Li et al., 2013), that contrasts a single idea giver with a 
single laborer, could be viewed as artificial, because in real life ideas are often either executed 
by the idea giver her- or himself, or they are passed on to a group of laborers executing 
individual steps towards a larger creation. However, peopleÕs ideas are not always so complex 
that they need to be executed by an entire corporation, but a more common experience is to 
work in smaller groups or dyads in which sometimes one individual works towards the idea of 
another. However, we acknowledge that the set-up remains artificial to some degree in the 
experimental context of the current research.  
 Nevertheless, we believe that the current findings can have some implications for 
more applied domains such as how people think about the job market. In many domains, such 
as automobile production, physical labor has already largely been delegated to machines, and 
for other domains, such as autonomous driving, we are in the midst of the transition. In fact, 
machines become more and more intelligent and capable of learning (machine learning; 
LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015). So what is left for us to do? Human work of the future 
seems to be work of the mind. However, as the current findings suggest, we seem to have 
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trouble appreciating such unobservable effort of the mind. At this point in time, the creativity 
of the human mind still seems to exceed that of computers. As part of our adjustment to these 
new developments, scholars and practitioners in various job markets might be able to utilize 
perceived effort as a cue to signal value of mental work done by humans. As the present 
research suggests, increasing the salience of effort associated with the contribution of ideas 
can at least eliminate the robust default inclination of preferring labor over ideas (Study 3b). 
Whereas businesses of today make use of the Òlabor illusionÓ to modify consumersÕ 
perceptions (Buell & Norton, 2011), businesses of tomorrow might profit from a shift of 
linking effort with executing observable labor to it being more strongly associated with 
generating unobservable ideas.  
 The current work might also corroborate research on peopleÕs tendency to mystify 
creativity (Ritter & Rietzschel, 2017). However, in trying to increase awareness of the idea-
generation process as an effortful and systematic activity, the present findings might offer 
some insights for practitioners in the domain of education and training to overcome this 
tendency. Particularly, empirical research suggests that creativity trainings that frame 
creativity as effortful and actual hard work as opposed to unsystematic and unfocused 
incubation of the mind are more likely to improve creative performance (Scott, Leritz, & 
Mumford, 2004; see also Ritter & Mostert, 2017). Construing creativity as malleable and 
effortful, in turn, might also help reduce some of the stereotypes about theÐÐincorrectly 
assumed to be mostly maleÐÐÒcreative genius.Ó Such biases are based on the (erroneous) 
assumption that creativity is some mysterious capacity that people either possess or lack, and 
that men happen to be more likely to possess, but women lack. An effort-based account of 
creativity would be more in line with the empirical reality and prevent us from entertaining 
stereotypes like assuming that men, due to their alleged innate talent, generate ideas 
effortlessly like they turn on Òlight bulbs,Ó whereas only women, who lack such talent, need 
to nurture ideas over time by investing hard work (Elmore & Luna-Lucero, 2017). In fact, 
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construing creativity as malleableÐÐand thus worthy of investing effortÐÐ, can help to 
promote factual creative performance (OÕConnor et al., 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
 Sometimes people think that ideas are cheap, and that labor is everything. As we have 
seen, peopleÕs labor-valuation tendency rests on observable effort as a cue to inform their 
judgments. Despite our general inclination to value effort, labor, and work, most of what 
humans create these days, however, rests upon unobservable minds generating ideas. People 
should thus by no means stop appreciating effort and hard work, but rather take some time to 
consider the invisible labor done by creative minds as well. 
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Creative-Identity Questionnaire (Study 2) 
In this questionnaire, we are interested in how important creativity is to you personally. Please 
use the scale provided to indicate your (dis)agreement with each of the following statements. 
[In diesem Fragebogen interessieren wir uns dafr, wie wichtig Kreativitt fr Sie persnlich 
ist. Bitte nutzen Sie die zur Verfgung gestellte Skala um anzugeben, wie sehr Sie jeder der 
folgenden Aussagen (nicht) zustimmen.] 
1. I often think about being creative. 
[Ich denke oft darber nach, kreativ zu sein.] 
2. My friends think of me as a creative person. 
[Meine Freunde halten mich fr einen kreativen Menschen.] 
3. I do not have a clear concept of myself as a creative person. (reversed) 
[Ich habe nur eine vage Vorstellung von mir selbst als kreativer Persnlichkeit.] 
4. My friends think that creativity is important to me. 
[Meine Freunde denken, dass mir Kreativitt wichtig ist.] 
5. To be a creative person is an important part of my identity. 
[Eine kreative Person zu sein, ist ein wichtiger Teil meiner Identitt.] 
6. My colleagues or fellow students donÕt really expect me to be creative. (reversed) 
[Meine Kollegen oder Kommilitonen erwarten nicht unbedingt von mir, dass ich kreativ 
bin.] 
 
Protestant-Work-Ethic Questionnaire (Study 2) 
This questionnaire is about your opinion on the topic Òwork and life.Ó For each statement, 
please indicate how much you (dis)agree. 
[In diesem Fragebogen geht es um Ihre Ansicht zum Thema "Arbeit und Leben". Geben Sie 
bitte bei jeder der folgenden Aussagen an, wie sehr Sie ihr zustimmen oder nicht.] 
1. Dislike of hard work usually reveals a weak character. 
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[Abneigung gegen harte Arbeit offenbart in der Regel einen schwachen Charakter.] 
2. Life is a constant struggle with oneÕs own weaknesses. 
[Das Leben ist ein stndiger Kampf gegen die eigenen Schwchen.] 
3. Through hard work one becomes a better person. 
[Durch harte Arbeit wird man zu einem besseren Menschen.] 
4. There is nothing so satisfying than the feeling that one has done a good job. 
[Es gibt kaum etwas so Befriedigendes wie das Gefhl, dass man seine Arbeit gut gemacht 
hat.] 
5. Hard work builds the character. 
[Harte Arbeit bildet den Charakter.] 
6. Hard work yields more than spontaneous ideas. 
[Harte Arbeit bringt mehr als spontane Ideen.] 
7. Willingness to abstain and frugality are among the most important objectives in education. 
[Verzichtsbereitschaft und Gengsamkeit gehren zu den wichtigsten Erziehungszielen.] 
8. If one wins a lot of money, he or she should not spend it, but invest it into the future. 
[Wenn einer viel Geld gewinnt, sollte er es fr die Zukunft anlegen, statt es auszugeben.] 
9. Those who cannot resist the temptations of wealth, reveal weak character. 
[Wer den Verlockungen des Wohlstandes nicht widerstehen kann, offenbart 
Charakterschwche.] 
10. Those who want to be successful in the long run, must resist short-term temptations. 
[Wer langfristig erfolgreich sein will, muss sich kurzfristig in Verzicht ben.] 
 
Effort-Salience Manipulation (Study 3b) 
Baseline condition 
 Below, you see a photo of the painting (title: Òape with flowers at windowÓ). The idea 
for the painting is based on artist AÕs engagement with the work by Gabriel von Max, which 
deals with the relationship between humans and animals. For its implementation, artist B used 
acrylic, ink, and spray painting on paper (measures 80 x 100 cm). 
 [Weiter unten sehen Sie ein Foto des Bildes (Titel: ÒAffe mit Blumen am FensterÓ). 
Die Idee zum Bild basiert auf Knstler A's Beschftigung mit dem Werk von Gabriel von Max, 
das die Beziehung von Mensch und Tier zum Gegenstand hat. Fr die Umsetzung hat 
Knstler B Acryl, Ink, und Sprhfarbe auf Papier (Ma§e 80 x 100 cm) verwendet.] 
 
Effort-laborer condition (key manipulation in bold) 
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 Below, you see a photo of the painting (title: Òape with flowers at windowÓ). The idea 
for the painting is based on artist AÕs engagement with the work by Gabriel von Max, which 
deals with the relationship between humans and animals. Up to the idea for the painting, 
artist A invested approximately 4 hours into this engagement. For its implementation, 
artist B used acrylic, ink, and spray painting on paper (measures 80 x 100 cm). Overall, artist 
B invested approximately 26 hours into the implementation of the painting. 
 [Weiter unten sehen Sie ein Foto des Bildes (Titel: ÒAffe mit Blumen am FensterÓ). 
Die Idee zum Bild basiert auf Knstler A's Beschftigung mit dem Werk von Gabriel von Max, 
das die Beziehung von Mensch und Tier zum Gegenstand hat. Bis zur Idee zum Bild hat 
Knstler A ca. 4 Stunden in diese Beschftigung investiert. Fr die Umsetzung hat Knstler B 
Acryl, Ink, und Sprhfarbe auf Papier (Ma§e 80 x 100 cm) verwendet. Insgesamt hat Knstler 
B ca. 26 Stunden in die Umsetzung des Bildes investiert.] 
 
Effort-idea-giver condition (key manipulation in bold) 
 Below, you see a photo of the painting (title: Òape with flowers at windowÓ). The idea 
for the painting is based on artist AÕs engagement with the work by Gabriel von Max, which 
deals with the relationship between humans and animals. Up to the idea for the painting, 
artist A invested approximately 26 hours into this engagement. For its implementation, 
artist B used acrylic, ink, and spray painting on paper (measures 80 x 100 cm). Overall, artist 
B invested approximately 4 hours into the implementation of the painting. 
 [Weiter unten sehen Sie ein Foto des Bildes (Titel: ÒAffe mit Blumen am FensterÓ). 
Die Idee zum Bild basiert auf Knstler A's Beschftigung mit dem Werk von Gabriel von Max, 
das die Beziehung von Mensch und Tier zum Gegenstand hat. Bis zur Idee zum Bild hat 
Knstler A ca. 26 Stunden in diese Beschftigung investiert. Fr die Umsetzung hat Knstler 
B Acryl, Ink, und Sprhfarbe auf Papier (Ma§e 80 x 100 cm) verwendet. Insgesamt hat 
Knstler B ca. 4 Stunden in die Umsetzung des Bildes investiert.] 
 
Painting Shown to Participants (Study 3b) 
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Note. Photograph of the painting shown to participants in all three conditions (courtesy of [masked for review]). 
Due to ethical reasons, the original title (ÒCheck out this assholeÕs new artblockÓ) was replaced with ÒApe with 
flowers at windowÓ (Study 3b). 
 
